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Abstract
Two players with preferences distorted by the focusing effect (Kőszegi and
Szeidl, 2013) negotiate an agreement. Our main result it that, as long as their
preferences are differentially distorted, an issue will be inefficiently left out of
the agreement or inefficiently included in the agreement whenever the impor-
tance of the other issues on the table is sufficiently large. In extreme cases,
this could lead to an inefficient breakdown of the negotiation. Anticipating
this possibility, the negotiating parties may negotiate in stages, by first signing
an incomplete agreement and later finalizing the outcome of the negotiation.
As in Raiffa (1982), these incomplete agreements may impose bounds on some
dimensions of the bargaining solution in order to reduce their salience.
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1 Introduction
The literature on decision theory and behavioral economics has long argued that
preferences are context dependent, that is, a person’s preference ranking may depend
on the available consumption possibilities. A well understood implication is that a
person’s choices may be suboptimal when evaluated from some ex-ante view point,
which implies that this person may prefer to eliminate certain options from her choice
set before making her final choice.1 However, the implications of context dependence
for how people negotiate joint decisions received considerable less attention and are
therefore much less understood. This is despite the fact that, according to practition-
ers, behavioral and psychological elements play a key role in determining the outcome
of negotiations. Motivated by this observation, in this paper we are interested in es-
tablishing whether two bargaining parties with context-dependent preferences may
reach a bargaining outcome that is suboptimal from the ex-ante viewpoint, such as,
for example, a breakdown of the negotiation.2 We are also interested in establishing
whether the bargaining parties benefit from negotiating in stages, by first signing an
agreement that eliminates certain options from their future bargaining set, and then
finalizing the outcome of the negotiation.
We consider a specific source of context dependence, namely the focusing effect.
The focusing effect (or focusing illusion) occurs whenever a person places too much
importance on certain aspects of her choice set (i.e., when certain elements are more
salient than others). Intuitively, an agent’s attention is unconsciously and automat-
ically drawn toward certain attributes, which are therefore overvalued when making
a choice. Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) formalize this concept by assuming that agents
1See, for example, Strotz (1955), Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini
(2001), Sarver (2008), Noor (2011), Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer
(2013), Bushong, Rabin and Schwartzstein (2017).
2A large literature has studied so called “rationalist explanations for war”, that is, reasons why
rational players may fail to find an efficient agreement. Those reasons are information asymmetries
(see Slantchev, 2010), large indivisibilities (see Fearon, 1995), lack of commitment (see Fearon, 1996,
Powell, 1993), and multilateral bargaining failures (see Ray, 2009). Here we abstract away from
those mechanisms. By studying the implications of a well known behavioral bias for negotiations,
we aim at providing a “non-rationalist” explanation to why players may fail to find an efficient
agreement.
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maximize a focus-weighted utility















where C is the choice set and h() is the focusing function, assumed strictly increasing.
In this formalization, an agent overweighs the utility generated by the attributes
in which her options differ more, where these differences are measured in utility terms.
There is ample empirical evidence for this. For example, Schkade and Kahneman
(1998) show that when asked about comparing life in California and in the Midwest,
most people report California as the best place to live and cite the weather—i.e.,
the dimension in which the two choices differ the most—as the main reason. Despite
this, actual measures of life satisfaction in the two regions are similar. Similarly,
Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz and Stone (2006) show that people place too
much weight on differences in monetary compensation when asked to compare job
offers, which is the dimension in which these offers differ the most.3 The focusing
effect plays an important role also in negotiations. For example, according to Raiffa
(1982), the importance that the bargaining parties attach to an issue depends on the
range of possible outcomes on that issue (see later for more discussion about Raiffa,
1982, and, in particular, his account of the Panama Canal negotiation).
In our model, two players negotiate over n discrete issues and one continuous issue
which we interpret as a transfer. In the next subsection (Subsection 1.1), we provide
an illustrative example considering a peace negotiation between a government and
a rebel group, but the model is sufficiently general to encompass buyer-seller nego-
tiations as well as complex international negotiations. Both players’ preferences are
3There is also a recent literature studying contract and menu design when consumers’ preferences
are distorted by the focusing effect; see, for example, Apffelstaedt and Mechtenberg (2017) and
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Köster and Peiseler (2019).
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distorted by the focusing effect, but not necessarily in the same way: we allow each
player to have his own focus function, so that one player could be “more focused”
than the other. The players’ focus weights are determined by their focus function and
the consideration set : the set of bargaining outcomes that are considered possible.
We assume that the consideration set contains all bargaining outcomes that satisfy
the participation constraint of at least one player. This way, extreme, unreason-
able bargaining outcomes are not considered possible by the players, and hence do
not affect their preferences. This assumption implies that the players’ participation
constraints determine the players’ focus weights, while, at the same time, the focus
weights determine the players’ preferences and their participation constraints. Hence,
solving for the focus weights is a fixed-point problem for which we show existence
and uniqueness. Finally, we assume that the bargaining parties achieve a bargaining
solution satisfying Nash (1953)’s axioms for given focus weights. As we will see, this
implies that irrelevant alternatives affect the bargaining solution exclusively via the
players’ preferences, and not via the specific bargaining solution chosen.4
We derive conditions under which the outcome of the negotiation is materially
inefficient relative to a rational benchmark in which all focus weights are equal to
1. A first necessary condition for an inefficient outcome to occur is that the players’
preferences are differentially distorted by the focusing effect, i.e., the two players’
focusing functions are not identical. A second necessary condition is that there is
more than one issue on the negotiating table. When these two conditions are satisfied,
inefficiencies arise if the issues under consideration are uneven in their importance.
More precisely, a given issue will be inefficiently included into the agreement or
inefficiently excluded from the agreement whenever the importance of this issue is
sufficiently small relatively to the other issues on the table. This could even lead to
a total breakdown of the negotiation.
Intuitively, the player whose preferences are more strongly distorted by the fo-
4Furthermore, as we argue in more detail in Section 2, also in our case the Nash bargaining
solution can be implemented non-cooperatively via a game of alternating offers. As we discuss
below, the focus of this paper is the sequence of agreements. For this reason, we use a cooperative
bargaining solution allowing us to abstract away from the sequence of offers and counteroffers
leading up to each agreement.
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cusing effect is also more focused on the transfer dimension than the opponent. This
player therefore dislikes making a transfer more than the opponent enjoys receiving
that transfer. The difference in how the two players evaluate a transfer increases
when the importance of an issue increases. When this difference is sufficiently large,
then an issue may inefficiently be excluded from (resp. included into) the agreement
if the more focused player should make (resp. should receive) the additional transfer
required to include that issue.5 Hence, unlike most behavioral models, here the emer-
gence of inefficiencies does not depend on the distortion of the players’ preferences,
but rather on their relative distortion.
We then allow the players to negotiate in stages. In the first stage, the players
can sign an incomplete agreement that imposes a constraint on the future bargaining
set. If they fail to find an agreement at this stage, they will move to a negotiation
over the entire bargaining set. If, instead, they agree on an incomplete agreement,
in the following period, they finalize the negotiation by choosing an outcome from
the constrained bargaining set. At this stage of the negotiation, the players may
wish to eliminate an issue that would otherwise be inefficiently included in the final
agreement, or to include an issue that would otherwise be inefficiently excluded from
the final agreement. In the first case, the players can easily achieve their goal by
agreeing ex-ante that such issue will not be on the table in the future. In the second
case, however, simply agreeing that a given issue will be included in the future
agreement may not work. The reason is that in the last stage of the negotiation
the players can disagree—and hence, quite trivially, not include any issue in the
agreement. It follows that such commitment constraints the players future options
without affecting their future preferences. Alternatively, the players may achieve the
inclusion of an issue by reducing the salience of the transfer dimension. One way to
do so is to eliminate from the bargaining set redundant issues, that is, issues over
which the players do not expect to reach an agreement. To reduce the salience of
the transfer dimension further, the players may also impose bounds on the transfer
dimension. Imposing such bounds, however, generates a cost because they may
5Interestingly, this result can be empirically tested even without knowing which player has the
most distorted preferences. See the Conclusion.
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be binding in the future and hence prevent the players from implementing their
preferred transfer. We provide a numerical example in which such bounds are used
in equilibrium.
In our model, the one-step negotiation is the outside option of the negotiation
over incomplete agreements. Hence, if the players agree to impose an incomplete
agreement, then they both must be better off relative to the outcome of the one step
negotiation. If their preferences are rational when negotiating the incomplete agree-
ment, this immediately implies that if an incomplete agreements is used in equilib-
rium, then efficiency is strictly larger relative to the one-step negotiation. However,
the negotiation over incomplete agreements is a Non Transferrable Utility (NTU)
problem, because the players are not allowed to make transfers at this stage. Hence,
there is no presumption that the players will always use an incomplete agreement to
increase the efficiency of the negotiation when it is feasible to do so. Interestingly, we
show that these results hold also when the players’ preferences are distorted by the
focusing effect while negotiating the incomplete agreement. The reason is that the set
of bargaining outcomes achievable by imposing a specific incomplete agreement is,
in general, strictly smaller than the full bargaining set. Hence, when negotiating the
incomplete agreement the players’ preferences are less distorted than in the one-step
negotiation. Also in this case, the possibility of imposing an incomplete agreement
is welfare improving.
In our model, therefore, the players may use incomplete agreements in order to
reduce the salience of certain dimensions of the problem. This mechanism is well
understood by practitioners, who believe that in negotiations “the importance of
an issue might be lessened by the parties first narrowing the range of possible out-
comes on that issue” (Raiffa, 1982, “The art and science of negotiation” p. 216).6
A textbook example for this negotiating procedure is the use of so-called “thresh-
old agreements” during the Panama Canal negotiations between the Panamanian
government and the US government. The threshold agreements guaranteed to the
Panamanian government the achievement of minimum outcomes on three different
issues, and were initiated by the American delegation to avoid the break-off of the
6See also Fisher, Ury and Patton (1991) “Getting to yes”, p. 172.
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negotiation.7
Incomplete agreements are widely used, well beyond thresholds agreements. A
case in point is the use of framework agreements in international negotiations and in
procurement. In international negotiations, each round of negotiation is concluded
by an agreement, which is not final but provides the framework for a later round of
negotiations.8 In procurement, a framework agreement may define, for example, a
set of prices and quality levels of a possible future transaction, with the understand-
ing that the details of this transaction will be established in a future agreement.
Our theory provides a possible explanation to why these incomplete agreements are
used, especially when they impose bounds, reduce the number of issues on the table,
or specify certain provisions of the final agreement. The main novelty of our the-
ory relative to the existing literature on incomplete contracts (which we discuss in
details at the end of this section) is that it applies to environments with no uncer-
tainty. It, therefore, provides a rationale for scheduling different bargaining rounds
independently from the arrival of new information.
We structure the paper in the following way. In the remainder of this section, we
provide an illustrative example and then discuss the relevant literature. In Section
2 we introduce the model. In Section 3 we solve for the one-step negotiation. In
Section 4 we introduce an additional bargaining round. In Section 5 we show that
our results hold also when preferences are distorted by the focusing effect already
when negotiating the incomplete agreement. In Section 6 we discuss a number of
extensions, including the possibility that a previous incomplete agreement may be
ignored, and other forms of context-dependent preferences different from the focusing
7The three threshold agreements were on the jurisdiction of the Panamanian canal, the Pana-
manian participation in its defense, and on the operation of the canal. The American delegations
initiated the discussion of three threshold agreements to “avoid the break-off of the negotiations
and to demonstrate the good will that would be necessary for later Panamanian concessions.” See
Raiffa (1982) p. 178.
8This principle is sometimes explicitly stated as “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed ”,
in the sense that any agreement that involves some specific issues cannot be considered final until
all other issues are settled. Such an agreement should, therefore, be interpreted as a constraint on
future bargaining rounds. See, for example, the rules governing the Doha round of trade negotia-
tions. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/work_organi_e.htm (accessed on the 5th of
October 2018).
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effect. The last section concludes. Unless otherwise noted all proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
1.1 Illustrative example
For intuition, consider a peace negotiation between a government and a rebel group
seeking independence for a region. Suppose that the parties reach an agreement in
which the rebel group accepts to disband while the government makes a significant
monetary transfer to that region, and that this agreement is materially efficient.
Consider now the same negotiation with an additional issue on the table: whether
the rebel group accepts stricter controls by the central government on the regional
government (for example, by having the regional police force controlled by the central
government). For both players, this second issue is very important—in the sense of
generating a large benefit for the government and a large cost for the rebel group
if included. Hence, it is possible to include this issue in the peace agreement only
by significantly increasing the transfer made by the government. For the sake of the
argument, assume that agreeing on this second issue is inefficient, because the cost
for the rebel group is larger than the benefit for the government.
If the players’ preferences are context dependent, then their preferences with re-
spect to the first issue (that is, whether to disband) may change with the introduction
of the second issue. Furthermore, if their preferences are context dependent because
of the focusing effect, the possibility of including the second issue and making a very
large transfer drives both players’ focus towards this dimension of the negotiation.
Suppose the rebel group is less focused than the government (which may be under
pressure due to an upcoming election). In this case, the presence of the second issue
makes the government more sensitive to the transfer dimension than the rebel group.
It is therefore possible that there is a breakdown of the negotiation and no peace
agreement is signed. If instead the rebel group is more focused than the government,
then the rebel group overweighs receiving a transfer (relative to the government) and
the players may sign a peace agreement including both issues.
Finally, government and the rebel group may benefit from signing an incomplete
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agreement. If the rebel group is less focused than the government, than both players
are better off by agreeing beforehand that they will only discuss the first issue—and
therefore achieve an efficient peace agreement. In this case, incomplete agreements
are used in equilibrium and they improve the efficiency of the negotiation. If instead
the government is less focused than the rebel group, then the players may fail to sign
an incomplete agreement. This happens whenever, by not imposing any restriction
on the future bargaining set, the government obtains its most preferred outcome: an
agreement on both issues while making a relatively low transfer. This is an example
of a situation in which the players fail to improve the efficiency of a negotiation via
an incomplete agreement.
1.2 Relevant Literature
A few studies have examined the impact of various behavioral biases in negotiations.
For example, Bénabou and Tirole (2009) consider a bargaining model with self-
serving beliefs and show that inefficient negotiation breakdown may occur. Inefficient
breaksdowns and delays are also possible in models with heterogeneous beliefs (such
as Yildiz, 2004 and Nageeb Ali, 2006). Inefficient delays also arise in Compte and
Jehiel (2003), who introduce reference-dependent utility in a game of alternating
offers. Because we consider a different behavioral mechanism, the conditions under
which inefficiencies arise are different in our paper than in the papers mentioned
above. Furthermore, novel with respect to the literature, we consider multiple issues
and hence the possibility that issues are inefficiently included into or excluded from
the final agreement. Also related is Shalev (2002), who considers loss aversion and
shows that, similarly to risk aversion, loss aversion worsen the bargaining outcome
of a player. Here instead we are interested in the welfare consequence of the focusing
effect, and not so much in the way surplus is shared. However, we are close to Shalev
(2002) methodologically because he solves the model cooperatively and then argues
that the same solution can be implemented non-cooperatively.
The literature on incomplete contracts has long argued that behavioral biases
and cognitive limitations may explain why agreements are often incomplete (see, for
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example, Segal, 1999; Battigalli and Maggi, 2002; Bolton and Faure-Grimaud, 2010;
Tirole, 2009; Hart and Moore, 2008; Herweg and Schmidt, 2015 and Herweg, Karle
and Müller, 2018). However, to the best of our knowledge, all these explanations
rely on the resolution of some uncertainty: after signing an incomplete contract,
the arrival of new information makes the environment less complex, reduces the
number of possible contingencies, and allows the contract to be either executed or,
if renegotiation is allowed, completed in a final negotiating round.9 Instead, we
consider a deterministic environment. This is justified by the observation that in
many negotiations the start of a new bargaining round follows the end of the previous
round and is not determined by the arrival of new information. With respect to this
literature, our contribution is therefore to provide a foundation for the existence of
incomplete agreements in contexts with no uncertainty.10
Despite this, in our model, when negotiating an incomplete agreement, the players
face a tradeoff between the benefit of preference alignment and the cost of imposing
restrictions to the bargaining set. This tradeoff is reminiscent of Hart and Moore
(2008). In that paper, if a dimension of the future bargaining problem is left un-
specified, each player will feel entitled to the best outcome within the set of possible
outcomes in compliance with the initial contract. This feeling of entitlement will
affect the final outcome because players may shade on performance. Similar to our
model, Hart and Moore (2008) assume that this feeling of entitlement is not present
when negotiating the initial contract. Hence, the players may use the initial contract
to reduce the set of options available to their future selves, reduce the future sense of
entitlement and align ex-post preferences with the ex-ante ones. These restrictions
9An exception are models based on unawareness, such as, for example, Von Thadden and Zhao
(2012), Auster (2013) and Schumacher and Thysen (2017), in which an informed principal offers
a contract to an unaware agent. This contract determines what the agent will be aware of when
choosing an action, which implies that the principal may want to offer an incomplete contract so
to leave the agent unaware of certain elements. This framework is, however, not directly applicable
to the study of negotiations in which both players could be identical.
10Some authors argue that, if information is perfect but players are prevented from writing a
complete contract, then the players may decide to leave some potentially contractible aspects of
an agreements unspecified (see Bernheim and Whinston, 1998, Battaglini and Harstad, 2016 and
Harstad, 2007). In our paper, instead, the bargaining parties can reach an agreement without
having first signed an incomplete agreement.
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have a cost because they may prevent the players from implementing the ex-post
efficient trade.
Also, papers studying incomplete contracts assume that the players can make
transfers both ex-ante (when signing the contract or allocating ownership) and ex-
post (after the realization of the state of the world). In negotiations, instead, all
utility-relevant events (including transfers) occur at the end, after the agreement is
signed. In our model, therefore, we do not allow the players to make payments ex-
ante (that is, when discussing the incomplete agreement). We assume that only one
agreement is possible, the final one, so that all transfers and exchanges will realize
conditional on reaching an agreement during the last round of negotiation. This also
distinguishes us from Esteban and Sákovics (2008), who allow the negotiating parties
to sign separate agreements on different parts of the surplus. It also distinguishes us
from the literature on agenda setting in negotiations, in which the players can reach
several, issue-specific agreements.11
Finally, we employ here the model of focusing in economic choice proposed by
Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), in which the decision maker overweighs attributes in which
her options vary the most. In their model of relative thinking, Bushong, Rabin
and Schwartzstein (2017) make the opposite assumption: that a decision maker
underweights attributes in which her options vary the most. Bordalo, Gennaioli and
Shleifer (2013) also develop a model of salience. They assume that agents overvalue
the attributes that differ the most with respect to a reference point.12 In Section 6.3
we discuss how our other results change when instead of using Kőszegi and Szeidl
(2013), we use either Bushong, Rabin and Schwartzstein (2017) or Bordalo, Gennaioli
and Shleifer (2013).
11See Lang and Rosenthal (2001), Bac and Raff (1996), Inderst (2000), Busch and Horstmann
(1999b), Busch and Horstmann (1999a), Flamini (2007), Chen and Eraslan (2017).
12Some recent papers study the implications of salience theory for contract theory; see, for
example, Carroni, Mantovani and Minniti (2019) and Inderst and Obradovits (2019). See also
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Gerhardt, Riener, Schwerter and Strang (2017) for an experimental comparison
of these different models of focusing/salience.
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2 The Model
Two players a and b are engaged in a negotiation over i ∈ {1, ..., n} discrete issues
and a continuous issue t. We interpret t > 0 as a transfer t from b to a, while t < 0
is a transfer |t| from player a to player b. If there is no agreement on issue i, the
status quo on that issue is maintained, in which case the players’ payoffs from issue
i are normalized to zero. If there is an agreement on issue i, player a earns αi while
player b earns βi, where αi and βi could be positive or negative real numbers. We
call qi ∈ {1, 0} the bargaining outcome with respect to issue i, and say that qi = 1 if
there is an agreement on issue i, and qi = 0 if there is no agreement on issue i. The
bargaining set is therefore X ≡ {1, 0}× ...×{1, 0}×R, with x = {q1, q2, ..., qn, t} ∈ X
a possible bargaining outcome.
We make the following parametric assumptions:
1. there is at least an issue i such that αi · βi < 0.
2. there are no issues i ≤ n such that αi < 0 and βi < 0.
As it will become clear later (see Equation 3.5), issues that generate costs to both
players will never be included into an agreement, and issues that generate benefits
to both players are always included into the final agreement. The first restriction
therefore excludes from our analysis the uninteresting case in which, independently
from the focusing effect, all issues are included into or excluded from the agreement.
The second restriction is instead without loss of generality. The reason is that, as we
will show later, issues that generate costs to both players are irrelevant in determining
the shape of the consideration set (see Equations 3.1 and 3.2).
This environment nests several bargaining problems. For example, it corresponds
to a standard buyer-seller negotiation whenever βi > 0 > αi for all i ≤ n, so that all
benefits accrue to player b and all costs accrue to player a. Alternatively, we could
have an international negotiation in which some benefits accrue to each player.
We allow the players to negotiate in stages. In the first stage, the players can
sign an incomplete agreement that imposes a constraint on the future bargaining
set, but they can also not sign any incomplete agreement. If they do not sign an
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incomplete agreement, they move to a negotiation over the entire bargaining set.
If they instead agree on an incomplete agreement, in the following period, they
finalize the negotiation by choosing an outcome from the constrained bargaining
set. Independently from what was agreed in period 1, during the last round of
negotiation each player can unilaterally choose the no-agreement option. There is
no time discounting.13
Definition 1 (Incomplete agreements). An incomplete agreement is a set S ⊂ X,
assumed closed and bounded. A negotiation structure S is the collection of S that
can be chosen in period 1.
Note that, because there is no time discounting, a one-step negotiation is equivalent
to a two-step negotiation in which the outcome of the period-1 negotiation is S = X.
We assume that this option can be chosen unilaterally by either player, and hence
constitutes the outside option of the first-stage negotiation.
Assumption 1 (Outside option). If in period 1 the parties disagree, then in period
2 they bargain over the unconstrained bargaining set X. If in period 2 the players
disagree, then the negotiation ends with no agreement.
In the final negotiating round, players have context-dependent preferences à la
Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013). Before writing these preferences, we first define the play-
ers’ consideration set, that is, the set of outcomes that each player considers as
possible. Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) argue that the consideration set should be equal
to the agent’s choice set, with the possible exclusion of options that are dominated
(that is, very bad in all attributes; see Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013, Section 2.2, remark
2). Here, no issue is “dominated” in the sense that all issues have positive value for
at least one player. Some transfers, however, may be so extreme that, if included
in an agreement, would lead to a breakdown of the negotiation no matter how the
other n issues are resolved. The following assumption implies that those transfers
are not part of the players’ consideration set.
13Equivalently, the players earn their payoffs sufficiently far in the future relative to the moment
in which the agreement is signed, so that whether a given agreement is achieved in one- or two-steps
is irrelevant.
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Assumption 2 (Consideration set). Consider a bargaining outcome x = {q1, q2, ..., qn, t} ∈
X with t > 0 (t < 0). This bargaining outcome is in the consideration set if and only
if it satisfies player b’s (player a’s) participation constraint and does not violate any
prior incomplete agreement.
That is, a bargaining outcome is in the consideration set if it satisfies the participation
constraint of the player making the transfer.14 Note also that the above assumption
implies that prior incomplete agreements are binding.15
Having specified the players’ consideration set, we can now write their utility
functions. Call ha() player a’s focus function and hb() player b’s focus function, both








hb(|βi|)βi · qi − hb(t̄− t)t,
where, for all i ≤ n, ha(|αi|), ha(t̄ − t), hb(|βi|), and hb(t̄ − t) are the players’ focus
weights. The focus weight on a given issue depends on the utility generated by in-
cluding that issue in the final agreement. The focus weight on the transfer dimension
depends on t̄ ≥ 0 and t ≤ 0, which are the largest and smallest transfer from player
b to player a in the consideration set. The focusing effect causes each player to focus
more on, and hence to overweigh, the dimension of the bargaining problem with
the largest difference in terms of possible bargaining outcomes. Finally, the focus-
14In an earlier version of the paper, instead of defining the consideration set as the set of bar-
gaining outcomes that satisfies the participation constraint of either one or the other player, we
assumed that a bargaining outcome is in the consideration set if it satisfies the participation con-
straint for both players. The results under this alternative definition are identical to those derived
here, but there are a number of additional complications related to the existence and uniqueness
of the consideration set. Since, a priori, neither the existing literature nor the specific problem at
hands calls for one definition or the other, we choose to work with the one that allows for more
straightforward derivations.
15We discuss in an extension (Section 6.2) the case of in which an incomplete agreement is binding
only in the current round of negotiation but can be ignored in future rounds if no agreement is
reached in the current round.
13
weighted utility is a decision utility, because it describes the decision maker’s choice.
We will contrast players’ decision utility with their material utility corresponding to
a rational benchmark in which all the focus weights are equal to one.




which measures the distortion in player a’s preferences relative to that of player b.
In what follows, we will mostly be concerned with three cases:
• ∆(x) = 1 for all x, which implies that ha() = hb(). That is: the players’
preferences are equally distorted by the focusing effect. We also say that the
players are “equally focused.”
• ∆(x) ≥ 1 and strictly increasing for all x > 0. That is: player a is always
“more focused” than player b, the more so the larger is x.
• ∆(x) ≤ 1 and strictly decreasing for all x > 0. That is: player b is always
“more focused” than player a, the more so the larger is x.
With respect to the players’ preferences in period 1, for ease of exposition, we
start by assuming that they are rational, that is, they do not depend on the set
of possible options in period 1 (see Section 4). We then assume that the players’
preferences are distorted by the focusing effect in period 1 as well (see Section 5).
We conclude the exposition of the model by introducing our last assumption:
Assumption 3 (Bargaining solution). Each bargaining round is solved by Nash bar-
gaining.
That is, we assume that, within each bargaining round and for given preferences,
the players will achieve an agreement that is invariant to affine transformations,
Pareto optimal, symmetric and satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (see
Nash, 1953). Of course, whereas in Nash (1953) the players’ preferences are one
of the primitives of the model, here instead they are endogenous and depend on
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the consideration set. Once the endogeneity of preferences is taken into account,
irrelevant alternatives might affect the bargaining solution.
This assumption allows us to focus on the sequence of agreements signed by the
players, without explicitly modeling the sequence of offers and counteroffers within
each negotiating round. Our results however easily extend to the case in which the
negotiation is modeled as a non-cooperative game. This is immediate for the case
of the variable threat game in Nash (1953). For the case of bargaining games of
alternating offers à la Rubinstein (1982), note that the benefit and cost of agreeing
on a given issue are the same in every period of the negotiation conditionally on
reaching such period (that is because the disutility of waiting is, at that point, sunk).
Therefore, if the consideration set is defined as in Assumption 2, the consideration set
and the players’ preferences do not change over time. This implies that the solution
to the game of alternating offers is again the Nash bargaining solution. Finally,
the period-1 bargaining game involves a positive outside option and non-transferable
utility, and hence the non-cooperative implementation Nash bargaining solution is
somewhat non standard.16 However, as we will see, our main results with respect
to period 1 (namely Proposition 3 and 4) only rely on the fact that the agreement
should be preferred by both players to their outside options, which is always true
independently of the specific model of bargaining.
3 One-step negotiation
Suppose that no agreement was imposed by the players in period 1, that is, the
players bargain in one step. By Assumption 2, in the one-step negotiation, the
bounds on the transfer dimension are given by
n∑
i=1
ha(|αi|) max{αi, 0} = −ha(t̄− t)t, (3.1)
16Although it can be done, for example, via a game of alternating offers with an exogenous




hb(|βi|) max{βi, 0} = hb(t̄− t)t̄. (3.2)
The following lemma shows the existence of t̄ and t, and establishes an important
preliminary result: absent a prior incomplete agreement, the salience of the transfer
dimension is increasing in the benefit generated by the issues under consideration
and in the number of issues under consideration.
Lemma 1. t̄ and t exist and are unique. Furthermore:
• ∀i ≤ n, t̄− t is strictly increasing in αi if αi > 0, and constant in αi otherwise,
• ∀i ≤ n, t̄− t is strictly increasing in βi if βi > 0 and constant in βi otherwise,
• t̄− t is strictly increasing in n.










hb(|βi|)βi · qi − hb(t̄− t)t
)
. (3.3)
Call the solution to the above problem {q∗1, ...q∗n, t∗}. Because of the focusing effect,
we have that a given issue i is included in the agreement (and hence q∗i = 1) if and













βi > 0. (3.5)
17Note that, in writing the Nash bargaining problem, we ignore the fact that t ≤ t ≤ t̄. The
reason is that this constraint is never binding. If it was, one of the two players would earn zero
surplus, which clearly does not maximize the objective function.
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We first derive conditions under which the outcome of the negotiation is efficient.
Lemma 2. If n = 1, then the outcome of the negotiation is efficient.
Hence, a necessary condition for the outcome to be inefficient is that there are
at least 2 issues on the table. This is similar to what is found by Kőszegi and Szeidl
(2013) (cf. their rationality in balanced trade-offs result in Proposition 3, applied to
two-attribute choices).
Lemma 3. If the players are equally focused (∆(x) ≡ 1), then the negotiating out-
come is materially efficient. That is, an issue is included in the final agreement if
and only if αi + βi > 0.
Quite interestingly, therefore, in this environment inefficiencies emerge not be-
cause players have preferences that are distorted by the focusing effect, but rather
because players have preferences that are differentially distorted by the focusing
effect. The next lemma shows that this is indeed the case.
Lemma 4. Assume n ≥ 2, and consider an issue i with αi · βi < 0. Suppose the
player who benefits from including issue i in the agreement (i.e. who should make
the additional transfer required to include that issue) is more focused than the other
player:
• If αi + βi > 0 then issue i is inefficiently excluded from the agreement for large
t̄− t but is efficiently included into the agreement for small t̄− t.
• If instead αi + βi < 0, then issue i is always efficiently excluded from the
agreement.
Suppose the player who bears the cost of including issue i in the agreement (i.e. who
would receive the additional transfer required to include that issue) is more focused
than the other player:
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• If αi + βi > 0, then issue i is always efficiently included into the agreement.
• If instead αi + βi < 0, then issue i is efficiently excluded from the agreement
for small t̄− t but is inefficiently included into the agreement for large t̄− t.
To say it more succinctly, if the player who should make the additional transfer
required to include an issue in the agreement is more focused than the other, then
it is possible that such issue is inefficiently excluded from the agreement. If instead
the player who would receive the additional transfer required to include an issue in
the agreement is more focused than the other, then it is possible that such issue
is inefficiently included into the agreement. The inefficient outcome is more likely
to occur whenever the salience of the transfer dimension is large. Intuitively, the
willingness of the players to include an additional issue in the agreement depends on
two elements: the perceived utility of receiving a transfer relative to the perceived
disutility of making a transfer. Both of these elements increase when the salience of
the transfer dimension increases. However, depending on who is more focused, one
will grow faster than the other.
An important corollary of the above lemma is that when the salience of the
transfer dimension is reduced, the players are more likely to behave as rational.
Corollary 1. Suppose that, following a reduction in t̄− t, the focus-weighted surplus
on issue i goes from positive to negative (from negative to positive). Then it must be
that αi + βi < 0 (αi + βi > 0).
That is, if the salience of the transfer dimension decreases, the players become more
likely to evaluate the surplus of including an issue in the agreement in the same way
as rational players would.
Of course, the salience of the transfer dimension is endogenous. The next propo-
sition provides sufficient conditions on the primitives of the problem for an inefficient
outcome to emerge.18
18The conditions of the proposition are necessary and sufficient if we restrict to situations in
which one player is more focused than the other (or they are equally focused), as discussed on page
14. Without such an assumption, however, they are only sufficient because some focus functions do
not allow to rank players in terms of who is more focused.
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Proposition 1. Suppose n ≥ 2 and consider issue i with αi · βi < 0. Suppose that
the player who should make (would receive) the additional transfer required to include
that issue in the agreement is more focused than the other player and αi + βi > 0
(αi +βi < 0). Then the agreement will be inefficient with respect to issue i whenever
• some βj > 0 with j 6= i is sufficiently large.
• some αj > 0 with j 6= i is sufficiently large.
• n is sufficiently large.
Hence, the outcome on a given issue may be inefficient whenever the value of
agreeing on some other issue is sufficiently large, or if there are sufficiently many
issues on the table. The reason is that, as the value of an unrelated issue or the
number of issues increases, then the salience of the transfer dimension increases (see
Lemma 1). If inefficiencies are possible for some focus-weight on transfer (see Lemma
4), then the outcome of the negotiation will be inefficient.
An important corollary of the above proposition is that the focusing effect may
cause an inefficient breakdown of the negotiation. For example, suppose that all
benefits accrue to a player (say player b) who is also more focused than the other
player, and that it is efficient to agree on issues k < n only. By the above proposition,
any issue i ≤ k will be inefficiently left out of the agreement whenever both benefit
and cost of some other issue j ∈ {k, ..., n} are sufficiency large. This implies that, if
benefit and cost of issues {k, ..., n} are sufficiency large, then no issue will be included
in the agreement, leading to a breakdown of the negotiation.
Another interesting observation is that fixing the benefit and costs generated by
each issue, the allocation of these costs and benefits matters for the material efficiency
of the negotiation.
Proposition 2. Consider a negotiation with a vector of costs and benefits Γ =
{α1, β1, α2, β2, ..., αn, βn}. Construct a new negotiation Γ′ = {α′1, β′1, α′2, β′2, ..., α′n, β′n}
with α′i = βi > 0 and β′i = αi < 0 for some issue i, and α′j = αj and β′j = βj for all
other issues j 6= i. If player a is more focused than player b (vice versa), then the
material efficiency of the negotiation is higher (lower) under Γ′ than under Γ.
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In other words, start with a given negotiation and, for a given issue, switch benefit
and cost between players, so to give more benefits to player a. By (3.1) and (3.2),
this has an effect on the focus weight on the transfer dimension. The proposition
shows that if player a is more focused than player b the efficiency of the negotiation
increases (while the opposite holds if b is more focused than a). Intuitively, the
salience of a given benefit βi is larger for the more focused player. At the same
time, also the salience of the transfer dimension is larger for that player. When we
reallocate benefits from the less focused player to the more focused player, therefore,
there are two competing forces at play: although the player receiving the benefit
values it more than the other, he is also less willing to make additional transfers.
The proof of the proposition shows that the second effect always dominates. Hence,
reallocating benefits to the more focused player leads to an overall decrease in t̄− t,
and, by Corollary 1, to an increase in the efficiency of the negotiation.
Finally, an interesting implication of the above proposition is that it may be pos-
sible to rank different negotiations in terms of efficiency as a function of which player
earns the benefit/bears the cost of each issue. Suppose that player a is more focused
than player b. Consider a negotiation in which player b earns all benefits, so that
βi > 0 for all i ≤ n. As discussed earlier, this situation corresponds to a negotiation
between a buyer (player b) and a seller (player a), where the seller is more focused
than the buyer. Starting from this negotiation, we can reallocate some benefits from
player b to player a, this way reaching a situation resembling international negoti-
ations in which benefits and costs accrue to both players. At the other extreme,
when all benefits are reallocated to player a, we achieve a buyer/seller negotiation
in which the buyer is more focused than the seller. The above proposition shows
that the buyer-seller negotiation in which the seller is more focused achieves the
lowest material efficiency, the buyer-seller negotiation in which the buyer is more fo-
cused achieves the highest material efficiency, and international negotiations achieve
intermediate levels of material efficiency.
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4 Two steps negotiation
The starting point in solving for the two step negotiation is specifying a negotiation
structure (see Assumption 1.2): what type of incomplete agreements the players can
sign in period 1. Here we restrict our attention to incomplete agreements that:19
• commit the players to include an issue in the final agreement.
• commit the players to exclude an issue from the final agreement.
• impose an upper bound T̄ ≥ 0 and a lower bound T ≤ 0 to the transfers that
can be made by the players.
We say that Qi = {1} if the players commit to include issue i in the final agreement,
Qi = {0} if the players commit to exclude issue i from the final agreement, and
Qi = {0, 1} otherwise.
An important observation is that, no matter what agreed in period 1, in period 2
the players may disagree, so that the bargaining outcome 0̄ = {q1 = 0, ..., qn = 0, t =
0} is always in the consideration set. Hence, agreeing to include an issue in the
future agreement imposes a constraint on the future bargaining set without affecting
the players’ preferences. On the other hand, both agreeing to exclude an issue and
imposing bounds on the transfer dimension will affect the period-2 preferences.
4.1 Period 2
The presence of a prior incomplete agreement affects the focus weight on the transfer
dimension as follows. The largest and lowest transfer in the consideration set are
now
t̄o = min{T̄ , t̃} to = max{T , t
˜
}
19In Section 6.1 we discuss what happens when other negotiating structures are considered.
21












hb(|βi|) max{βi, 0}1{Qi 6= {0}} = hb(t̃− t
˜
)t̃, (4.8)
where 1{.} is the indicator function, so that 1{Qi 6= {0}} = 0 whenever issue i was
excluded via an incomplete agreement, and 1{Qi 6= {0}} = 1 otherwise. Hence,
whenever T̄ ≥ t̃ the players are effectively negotiating without an upper bound
on transfers (and similarly whenever T ≤ t
˜
). Nevertheless, if a prior incomplete
agreement removes an issue from the table, this reduces the salience of the transfer
dimension (i.e. changes players’ preferences) via t̃ or t
˜
. If instead either T̄ ≤ t̃ or
T ≥ t
˜
, the bounds of the consideration set are determined explicitly by the incomplete
agreement signed by the players in period 1. Importantly, however, these bounds may
be binding, and therefore have a direct effect on the outcome of the negotiation (in
addition to their indirect effect via the players’ preferences).
The set of feasible bargaining outcomes is now x ∈ Q1 × ...×Qn × R ∪ 0̄ where
x = {q1, q2, ..., qn, t} and 0̄ is a vector of n + 1 zeros representing the no agreement



































An important observation is that, for any issue i with Qi = {0, 1}, also here
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this issue will be included only if it generates positive focus-weighted surplus (as
in condition (3.5)). Here, however, this condition is not sufficient to determine the
number of issues included in the agreement. The reason is that the constraints on
the transfer dimension may be binding and therefore affecting the ability of a player
to compensate the other for the inclusion of an additional issue in the agreement,
even if this issue generates positive focus-weighted surplus. That is, we are dealing
with a Non Transferable Utility (NTU) bargaining problem, in which the players
are constrained in the way they can share surplus. Because the Nash bargaining
program maximizes the product of the two utilities, in an NTU bargaining problem,
an inefficient solution that shares the available surplus equally may be chosen over
an efficient solution in which all surplus is captured by one of the two players.
4.2 Period 1
We now analyze the decision in period 1 to restrict the future bargaining set. Here
we assume that players are rational in period 1, while in the next section we assume
that the players’ preferences are distorted by the focusing effect in period 1 as well.
Call (qOS1 , ..., qOSn , tOS) the bargaining outcome in case they bargain in one step,










βi · (q∗i − qOSi )− (t∗ − tOS)
)
s.t.





i=1 ha(|αi|)αi · qi + ha(t̄o − to)t) (
∑n
i=1 hb(|βi|)βi · qi − hb(t̄o − to)t) ,
t̄o = min{T̄ , t̃}
to = max{T , t
˜
}
That is, the players will choose a bargaining outcome among those that can be
reached via an incomplete agreement. Note that, in case a period-1 agreement is
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reached, both players must be better off relative to the one-step negotiation. This
immediately leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If the players agree on an incomplete agreement in period 1, then
the material efficiency of the negotiation is greater than in one-step negotiation.
Note however that the proposition does not say that the players will choose the
materially efficient period-1 agreement, neither that they will always agree on an
incomplete agreement if doing so increases the efficiency of the negotiation. The
reason is that, again, the period-1 negotiation is a NTU bargaining problem: there
is no presumption that the outcome will be materially efficient. However, because
the outside option is the one-step negotiation, it must be that whatever is agreed
in period-1 is better for both players than the one-step negotiation. Because the
players have rational preferences, then whatever is agreed also increases the material
efficiency of the negotiation (relative to the one-step negotiation).
Practically speaking: how can the players achieve such an increase in the effi-
ciency of the negotiation? As discussed earlier, the possible inefficiencies arising in
the one-step negotiation are twofold: an issue can be inefficiently included into the
agreement or inefficiently excluded from the agreement. From period-1 point of view,
the first type of inefficiency can be easily resolved by eliminating such issue from the
future bargaining set. The second type of inefficiency is more complicated to address.
The players may agree in period 1 to include such issue in the future agreement. As
already discussed, however, such agreement does not affect the period-2 preferences
and may still lead to an inefficient outcome—for example a breakdown of the nego-
tiation. For this reason, the players may also decide to reduce the salience of the
transfer dimension. This can be easily achieved by eliminating from the bargaining
set all issues on which players expect no agreement to occur anyway. We call these
issues redundant issues. These observations imply the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The players always eliminate redundant issues and inefficient issues
from the bargaining set.
Proof. Directly from Corollary 1: players will always want to reduce the salience of
the transfer dimension when doing so is beneficial (because it eliminates inefficient
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issues) or has no other consequences (because it eliminates redundant issues that will
not be included in the agreement anyway).
The salience of the transfer dimension can be further reduced by imposing bounds
on future transfers. These bounds, however, may eliminate from the bargain set the
period-1 preferred outcome. When this is the case, then period-1 players are facing
a tradeoff: manipulating period-2 preferences to make them similar to the period-
1 preferences comes at the cost of excluding valuable bargaining outcomes. The
solution depends on how “focused” are period-2 players and therefore how costly it
is to make period-2 preferences similar to period-1 preferences.
We turn to a numerical example to demonstrate that players may use bounds
on transfers. In our example n = 2, β1 = 2, β2 = 1 and α1 = α2 = −0.95, so
that the materially efficient outcome is to agree on both issues. Hence, rational
players cannot do better than bargaining in one step and agreeing on both issues.
Preferences, however, are distorted by the focusing effect, where the focus functions
here take the form hb(x) = κ|x| + 1 and ha(x) = κ/4 · |x| + 1 with κ > 0. This
implies that player b is more focused than player a, which means that, in the one-
step negotiation, the second issue may be inefficiently excluded from the agreement.
Also, the parameter κ measures the strength of the focusing effect. Thus, in period 1
the players may want to impose bounds on the transfer dimension in order to induce
their future selves to include also issue 2 in the agreement. Note also that, because
all costs accrue to player a and all benefits accrue to player b, t
˜
= 0 and hence the
only bound on transfer the players may impose in period 1 is T̄ .
Figure 4.1 provides a numerical example of how T̄ affects the solution of the
negotiation (for κ = 1/20). For T̄ = t̃ = 2.845, the second issue is inefficiently
excluded from the agreement. For T̄ < t̃ with T̄ slightly below t̃, imposing such cap
reduces the salience of the transfer dimension and increases t∗ relative to tOS = 1.427
without affecting the number of issues included into the agreement. Also, there is an
intermediate range in which imposing a cap T̄ below t̃ leads to the inclusion of the
second issues into the agreement and a further increase in t∗ relative to tOS. Finally,













Figure 4.1: The period-2 transfer t∗ (solid black line) and the period-2 number of issues (dotted
gray line; gray filling) as a function of the cap on transfer T̄ set in period 1. Parameter values are
β1 = 2, β2 = 1, α1 = α2 = −0.95 and κ = 1/20, i.e. hb(x) = |x|/20 + 1 and ha(x) = |x|/80 + 1.
t̃ = 2.845 and tOS = 1.427.
agreement or a breakdown of the negotiation.
The parameter κ measures the intensity of the focusing effect. It is a convenient
way to measure the disagreement between period-1 and period-2 players. As κ in-
creases, period-2 preferences move further away from rational. As a consequence
generating a given degree of alignment between period-1 and period-2 preferences
requires a tighter cap. Hence, κ proxies how stringent is the tradeoff between the
benefit of preferences alignment and the cost of imposing restrictions on the future
bargaining set. In Table 4.1 we report the numerical solution of the period-1 problem
for a number of different κ, all chosen so that in the one-step negotiation the second
issue is inefficiently left out of the agreement. Indeed, for lower values of κ the play-
ers may impose a cap on the transfer dimension so to achieve the materially efficient
outcome. In this case, the players always impose the optimal cap, and are indifferent
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between forcing their future self to include any subset of issues in the agreement or
not (that is, they are indifferent between Qi = {0, 1} or Qi = {1} for i ∈ {1, 2}). For
high enough κ, instead, the players cannot do better than to negotiate in one step.
Table 4.1: Solution to the negotiation
κ one step two steps
1/20 tOS =1.427 qOS1 =1 qOS2 = 0 T̄ =2.385 t∗ =2.385 q∗1 = 1 q∗2 = 1
3/50 tOS =1.420 qOS1 =1 qOS2 = 0 T̄ =2.375 t∗ =2.375 q∗1 = 1 q∗2 = 1
3/40 tOS =1.410 qOS1 =1 qOS2 = 0 T̄ =none t∗ =1.410 q∗1 = 1 q∗2 = 0
1/10 tOS =1.397 qOS1 =1 qOS2 = 0 T̄ =none t∗ =1.397 q∗1 = 1 q∗2 = 0
5 Context-dependent preferences in period 1
If the negotiation is heated, conducted under pressure, or conducted by groups of
people who first have to agree among themselves and then with the other party,
then the players’ preferences may be far from rational already in period 1. In this
subsection we therefore consider the possibility that the focusing effect distorts also
the players’ period-1 preferences.
The point we want to make is that the period-1 context is different from period-2
context and hence, even if the focusing effect is present in both periods, period-1
preferences will be different from period-2 preferences. Hence, also here, in period 1
the players may value restricting the future bargaining set so to make their future
selves’ preferences better aligned with those of their present selves. Furthermore,
because the set of bargaining outcomes achievable from period-1 viewpoint is smaller
than the full bargaining set, the period-1 preferences will be “closer” to rational than
the period-2 preferences. Hence, also here, if the players impose an incomplete
agreement, this leads to an increase of the material efficiency of the negotiation.
In constructing the period-1 context, we maintain Assumption 2: a feasible bar-
gaining outcome is in the consideration set if and only if it satisfies one of the player’s
participation constraint. The key, however, is to realize that the bargaining outcomes
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that are feasible from period-1 view point are only those that can be achieved as an
outcome of the negotiation for some incomplete agreement S ∈ S.20 So, for example,
whereas in the one-step negotiation all issues are in the consideration set, this does
not have to be the case in period 1. It is possible that some issues are not valuable
(because costs exceed benefits by a large margin) and hence are never included in
any agreement no matter what S the players agree upon. These issues are therefore
not in the period-1 consideration set. The same applies to transfers. From period-1
viewpoint, the smallest and largest transfer in the consideration set are given by the
smallest and largest t∗ (as in Equation 4.10) that can be achieved for some incomplete
agreement.
Without loss of generality, order the issues such that:
• issues i ∈ {1, ..., z} are included in the final agreement of the one-step negotia-
tion, (where z ∈ {0, ..., n}, with the convention that if z = 0, then the one-step
negotiation leads to no agreement),
• issues i ∈ {z + 1, ..., w} are excluded from the final agreement of the one-
step negotiation, but can be included in the final agreement of the two-step
negotiation provided that a given incomplete agreement is signed in period 1
(where w ∈ {z, ..., n}, with the convention that if w = z, then such issues do
not exist).
Call the smallest and largest t∗ that can be achieved as a function of an incomplete
agreement (as in Equation 4.10) t∗ and t∗, respectively.21 Note that, t ∈ [t∗, t∗] is the
set of feasible transfers from period-1 viewpoint.
20This is equivalent to assuming that players are consequential. This assumption is already
made in Koszegi and Szeidl (2013, p. 73) and it basically says that an agent’s consideration set is
determined by the set of future outcomes achievable as consequence of today’s choices.
21The existence of t∗ and t∗ follows from the fact that, as already discussed in Section 4.1, when
T̄ is above a certain threshold, then the period-2 focus weights (and the period-2 solution as in
Equation 4.10) do not depend on T̄ . The same happens when T is below a certain threshold.
Without loss of generality, therefore, we can restrict T̄ to belong to a closed interval (and similarly
for T ). This, together with the fact that the objective function is continuous, guarantees that the
maximum and minimum of (4.10) exist.
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Define t̄1 and t1 as the largest and smallest transfers in the period-1 consideration
set (which we derive below). A feasible bargaining outcome x satisfies the player’s




ha(|αi|)αi · qi + ha(t̄1 − t1)t ≥
z∑
i=1




hb(|βi|)βi · qi − hb(t̄1 − t1)t ≥
z∑
i=1
hb(|βi|)βi − hb(t̄1 − t1)tOS,
Define t̃1 and t
˜








1 − tOS) (5.11)
w∑
i=z+1
hb(|βi|) max{βi, 0} = hb(t̃1 − t
˜
1)(t̃1 − tOS). (5.12)
Following the same logic discussed in Section 4.1, the largest transfer in the consid-
eration set t̄1 is the minimum between the largest feasible transfer and the largest
transfer satisfying the player a’s participation constraint, and similarly for t1:
t̄1 = min{t∗, t̃1} t1 = max{t∗, t
˜
1}.
The next lemma proves the existence and uniqueness of t̄1 and t1, and also char-
acterizes them with respect to t̄ and t (the largest and smallest transfer in the con-
sideration set of the one-step negotiation given by Equation 3.1 and 3.2).
Lemma 5. t̄1 and t1 exist and are unique. Furthermore, t̄1 − t1 ≤ t̄ − t. The
inequality is strict whenever z ≥ 1, or w < n, or both.
Remember that when z ≥ 1, then the one-step negotiation leads to an agreement
with at least one issue included. When w < n, then there is at least one issue that
will not be included in the final agreement for any incomplete agreement that may
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be signed in period 1. When either conditions holds, then the period-1 negotiation
is, effectively, about fewer issues than the one-step negotiation. If w < n this is
immediate: issues w + 1 to n are not feasible from period-1 viewpoint, while they
are feasible in the one-step negotiation. When z ≥ 1, the argument is more subtle:
it is because if z = 0, then the outside option of the period 1 negotiation is equal
to the outside option of the period 2 negotiation. If instead z ≥ 1, then the two
outside options are different: whatever issue is included in the one-step negotiation
constitutes the outside option of the period-1 negotiation and hence does not affect
the value of reaching an agreement in period 1.
Hence, when either z ≥ 1 or w < n, then t̄1 − t1 < t̄ − t. That is, period-1
preferences, although not rational, are “closer” to rational than the preferences in
the one-step negotiation. What we mean is the following: suppose that, in the one-
step negotiation, the focus-weighted surplus generated by an issue i is positive while
the “rational” surplus is negative. Then, because in period 1 the players are less
focused on the transfer dimension than in the one-step negotiation, by Corollary 1,
they may agree with their rational selves and, as a consequence, exclude such issue
from the future agreement. This implies the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose preferences are distorted by the focusing effect also in period
1. If either z ≥ 1 or w < n, then Proposition 3 holds.
Proof. Directly from Lemma 5 and Corollary 1.
Hence, the possibility of signing an incomplete agreement increases the mate-
rial efficiency of the negotiation, despite the fact that the players’ preferences are
distorted also when negotiating the incomplete agreement.
6 Discussion
We now discuss a number of variations in our basic assumptions. First, we consider
the possibility that the negotiation structure (i.e., the set of incomplete agreements
that can be chosen in period 1) is different from the one considered in the main
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text. In Section 6.2 we discuss what happens when incomplete agreements are non
binding in the sense that they can be ignored in subsequent bargaining rounds when
in the current bargaining round, no final agreement is reached. In Section 6.3 we
discuss how our results will change if we consider other forms of context dependence
different than the focusing effect.
6.1 Other negotiation structures
In the main text, we consider a negotiation structure inspired by Raiffa (1982)’s
threshold agreements: the players can include or exclude issues from the future
agreement, or impose bounds on the transfer dimension. Yet, other negotiation
structures are possible and may interact with context-dependent preferences. Quite
clearly, Proposition 3 will continue to apply, i.e., whenever players agree on an in-
complete agreement, the material efficiency of the negotiation is greater than in a
one-step negotiation. Other features of the equilibrium may, however, change with
the negotiation structure.
As a first example of another negotiation structure, consider the possibility that,
in period 1, the players can directly agree on the negotiation outcome. That is,
the negotiation structure S contains all singletons in X. It is reasonable to assume
that, in this case, preferences should be distorted in period-1 as well, because it is
effectively the moment in which the agreement is decided. However, if the players’
preferences are distorted by the focusing effect in period 1 as well, then the outcome
of the negotiation is the same as in the one-step negotiation. The reason is that
the range of possible bargaining outcome in period 1 is the same as in the one-step
negotiation, and hence the players’ preferences are identical in the two cases. Hence,
there is no difference between a one-step negotiation and a two-step negotiation in
which negotiation structure contains all singletons in X.
Another possibility is to allow the players to “bundle” issues, that is, to decide
in period 1 that if their future selves agree on issue i they must also agree on issue
j (or disagree on both issues, or agree on one and disagree on the other). This is
an interesting case and is reminiscent of the “nothing is agreed until everything is
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agreed” formula used in negotiations. What it is however unclear in this case is how
to write the period-2 focus weights. One could reasonably claim that if two issues
become “bundled” then there should be a single focus weight on both issues (that
is, they effectively become a single issue). We find this idea intriguing but prefer to
leave this extension for future work.
6.2 Non-binding incomplete agreements
In the text, we assumed that the players must respect a prior incomplete agreement.
This is, however, often not the case. In most jurisdictions, when facing a sequence
of agreements between two parties, in case a later agreement contradicts an earlier
agreement, courts typically enforce the most recent one. When courts are not avail-
able (for example, in the case of international negotiations), the same two parties are
free to jointly ignore a previous agreement. Furthermore, in some type of incomplete
agreements such as memorandum of understanding, it is explicitly stated that each
party can unilaterally withdraw from the incomplete agreement.
In this subsection we explain that our framework can rationalize the existence
of non-binding incomplete agreements. We introduce the following modification: in
period 2, the players can either comply with a prior incomplete agreement, or trigger
a third round of negotiation (at no cost). During the third round of negotiation,
they will be bargaining over the entire bargaining set. Depending on the situation,
triggering this additional negotiation round could be a joint decision, or even a
unilateral decision by a player (as in memorandum of understanding). In either case,
we say that incomplete agreements are non binding.
Non-binding incomplete agreements may nonetheless affect the outcome of the
negotiation because they will be in place in period 2 and affect the players’ prefer-
ences. The difference with the case considered in the main text is that, now, the
bargaining solution to the third negotiating round must be an element of the period-
2 consideration set. The presence of this element imposes a constraint on the way
in which period-1 players can manipulate period-2 preferences. For example, call
the transfer solving the period-3 bargaining problem t∗3. If this transfer is positive,
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then effectively period-1 agents are restricted to choosing T > t∗3 because a lower cap
will not have any effect on the player-2 consideration set. To summarize, the fact
that incomplete agreements are non binding imposes an additional constraint on the
period-1 problem, without, however, changing its basic tradeoff.
6.3 Other models of context dependence
We develop our argument using Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) because, as already dis-
cussed in the introduction, practitioners believe that reducing the range of possible
outcomes on a dimension reduces the importance of this dimension within a negoti-
ation (see Raiffa, 1982, p. 216). However, other models of context dependence have
been proposed.
Bushong, Rabin and Schwartzstein (2017) propose a model in which the salience
of a dimension decreases with the range of possible options in that dimension. Math-
ematically, the model is identical to that of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), except that
the focus functions ha() and hb() are decreasing. For our purposes, the fact that
the focus functions are decreasing implies that a cap on transfers will increase the
salience of the transfer dimension relative to no cap. It follows that the results
derived in Proposition 4 are now reversed. The salience of the transfer dimension
increases whenever βi > 0 or αj > 0 decreases. Hence the inefficient outcomes on a
given issue become more likely to occur when the value of reaching an agreement on
other issues are small rather than large.
The goal of Bushong, Rabin and Schwartzstein (2017) is to model range-based
relative thinking: the idea that given “the presence of greater ranges along a dimen-
sion, all changes along that dimension loom smaller.” An implication of range-based
relative thinking is the notion of diminishing sensitivity, where a fixed change is less
salient the wider the range of utility differences. In their introduction, they propose
the example of a 100 dollars optional “convenience” charge on a flight that costs 200
vs 500. When the starting price is higher, the additional charge will be less salient
and the consumer is more likely to purchase it.
An important element of this example is that the optional “convenience” charge
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cannot be purchased independently from the flight.22 In our model, instead, the
players can agree on any issue independently from all other issues. In other words,
no issue is an “add on” to another issue. Given this interpretation, we do not think
that diminishing sensitivity should be prominent in our analyses, and therefore prefer
to use Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013). Of course, in some cases, some issues will be “add
ons” to other issues, in which case the model proposed by Bushong, Rabin and
Schwartzstein (2017) is probably better suited to study the bargaining problem.
Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013) propose a model of salience in which differ-
ent options are evaluated relative to a reference point. This model could be applied
to our framework by assuming that imposing bounds on transfers shifts the reference
point of the transfer dimension. The effect of introducing these bounds will then de-
pend on whether the transfer dimension becomes more or less salient. If its salience
decreases, then we are back to a logic similar to Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), leading
to results qualitatively similar to the ones discussed in the body of the paper. If in-
stead its salience increases, then we are back to a logic similar to Bushong, Rabin and
Schwartzstein (2017), leading to results qualitatively similar to the ones discussed
above. We will be in one or the other case depending on how exactly imposing a
bound affects the reference point, which is an issue beyond the scope of this paper.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that, because of the focusing effect, too many or too few issues may
be included in an agreement (relative to a rational benchmark). As a consequence,
the players may negotiate in stages, by first restricting their future bargaining set
via an incomplete agreement, and then finalizing the negotiating outcome. Incom-
plete agreements in the form of threshold or framework agreements are relevant and
frequently used by practitioners in order to reduce the salience of certain issues (see
22This is an important element of many examples of diminishing sensitivity. A famous one is
the observation that people are willing to travel 10 minutes to another shop to save 30 dollars on
a product whenever the initial cost of the product is low (say 100 dollars) but not when it is high
(say 1000 dollars). Also here, it is not possible to get the discount independently from purchasing
the product.
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the discussion about Raiffa, 1982, in the Introduction). We show that when players
agree on an incomplete agreement, they always increase the material efficiency of
the negotiation (relative to a one-step negotiation). Our results therefore suggest
that incomplete agreements help negotiating parties reduce the inefficiency caused
by behavioral distortions, possibly even avoiding inefficient negotiation breakdowns.
However, due to an inherent non-transferable utility problem, there is no presump-
tion that the players will improve the outcome of the negotiation via an incomplete
agreement, even if it is possible to do so. There is also no presumption that they will
agree on the most efficient incomplete agreement.
The validity of our model is empirically testable, even without observing which
player is more focused. For given parameters, consider the agreement of a one-step
negotiation. Imagine now a counterfactual in which the importance of a given issue
i increases while the importance of all other issues is constant. By Proposition
1, depending on which player is more focused, in this counterfactual some issues
(other than i) that were part of the initial agreement may be dropped from the
agreement, while some other issues (again, other than i) that were not part of the
initial agreement may be included into the agreement. Importantly, once an issue
j 6= i is dropped from (resp. added to) the agreement, it won’t be included in (resp.
excluded from) the agreement again through further increases in the importance of
issue i.
Suppose to repeat the above experiment sufficiently many times with different
players randomly assigned to play as a or b, so that in some experiments player a will
be more focused than player b, while the opposite is true in some other experiments.
Under the null hypothesis that our model is valid we should observe that, unlike with
rational preferences, the probability that an issue j 6= i is included in the agreement
changes with the value of issue i. Furthermore, such a change is monotonic. Hence,
we should reject the validity of the model in two cases. First, if there is no issue i
such that changing its value affects the probability of reaching an agreement on the
remaining issues. Second, if this effect is non monotonic, that is, as the value of issue
i increases, there is an issue j 6= i that is first included, then excluded, then included
again etc. (or first excluded, then included, then excluded again etc.).
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We study restrictions on the bargaining set that are jointly agreed by the two
negotiating parties. We do so because negotiations are often structured as a sequence
of agreements. Nevertheless, one could also study restrictions to the bargaining set
that are unilaterally imposed by one party. We speculate that this could give rise
to a “theory of concessions” based on the focusing effect, where a party renounces
to some beneficial bargaining outcomes so to manipulate the opponent’s preferences
before starting a negotiation. Of course, an important issue is to what extent such
concessions are credible and hence influence the players’ consideration set. Solving
this issue, as well as determining the equilibrium of a game in which both players can
make concessions, is left for future work. Similarly, the restrictions on the bargaining
set could be imposed by a third party such as a mediator. An open question would
then be why this third party can impose a constraint on the bargaining set (but not a
bargaining solution directly) and what are his/her objectives. These considerations
are also left for future research.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (3.1) and (3.2) together yield
t̄− t =
∑n




i=1 ha(|αi|) max{αi, 0}
ha(t̄− t)
. (A.1)
The LHS is strictly increasing in t̄ − t; the RHS is strictly decreasing in t̄ − t, and
they always cross only once. If t̄− t exists and is unique, then also t̄ and t exist and
are unique. Also, the RHS of (A.1) is increasing in αi if αi > 0, in βi if βi > 0, and
in n, which implies our statement.
Proof of Lemma 2. If n = 1, then β1 · α1 < 0. Suppose β1 > 0 (the case α1 > 0 is
analogous). By (3.1) and (3.2) we have t̄ = β1 and t = 0. Hence, by (3.5), there is
an agreement if and only if
ha(|α1|)α1
ha(β1)
+ β1 > 0
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which is equivalent to β1 > −α1.





which is equivalent to αi + βi > 0 since hb(|x|) is increasing in |x|.
Proof of Lemma 4. We limit our proof to the case that player b is “more focused”
than player a (that is, ∆(x) ≤ 1 and strictly decreasing). The proof of the opposite
case follows by interchanging cases A.) and B.), respectively.
Case A.) αi < 0 and βi > 0: Suppose αi + βi < 0, that is, it is efficient not to
include issue i into the agreement. We consider two cases. The first one is
t̄− t ≤ |αi|. In this case, t̄ ≤ |αi| and the largest transfer player b is willing to
make does not cover the cost for player a of including issue i. This issue will,
therefore, not be included in the agreement. Second suppose that t̄− t > |αi|.
Then, the largest transfer player b is willing to make covers the cost for player
a of including issue i and issue i will be included into the agreement if the focus
weighted surplus generated by issue i is positive. By (3.4) the focus weighted










Because ∆(x) ≤ 1 and αi < 0 the above expression is always smaller than
ha(|αi|)αi + hb(|βi|)βi
which is negative whenever αi + βi < 0. Hence the players do not want to
include issue i in the agreement.
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Suppose next that αi + βi > 0. Then,
ha(|αi|)αi + hb(|βi|)βi > 0
because hb(|βi|) ≥ ha(|βi|) > ha(|αi|) and if t̄ − t sufficiently large, the focus
weighted surplus generated by including issue i in the agreement is negative
(despite being efficient to do so). On the other hand, if t̄− t is sufficiently small
the players will want to include issue i into the agreement.
Case B.) αi > 0 and βi < 0: Suppose αi + βi > 0, that is, it is efficient to include
issue i into the agreement. This implies that |βi| < αi. It further holds that
αi < ha(|αi|)αi and by (3.1) ha(|αi|)αi ≤ −ha(t̄− t)t. Therefore, ha(|αi|)αi ≤
ha(t̄ − t)(t̄ − t) which implies that αi ≤ (t̄ − t). By (3.5) the focus weighted







where the first term must be (weakly) larger than αi by αi ≤ (t̄ − t) and
∆(x) being decreasing in x and the second term must be smaller than βi by
|βi| < αi. Thus, the focus weighted surplus generated by issue i is positive
whenever αi + βi > 0.
Suppose next that αi + βi < 0. Then,
ha(|αi|)αi + hb(|βi|)βi < 0
because hb(|βi|) ≥ ha(|βi|) > ha(|αi|) and if t̄ − t sufficiently small, the focus
weighted surplus generated by including issue i in the agreement is negative.
On the other hand, if t̄− t is sufficiently large the players will want to include
issue i into the agreement (despite being inefficient to do so).
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 1, t̄− t is
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• increasing in βj, strictly so for βj > 0, for all j ≤ n.
• increasing in αj, strictly so for αj > 0, for all j ≤ n.
• increasing in n.
The statement then follows by Lemma 4.
Proof or Proposition 2. In the proof of Lemma 1, we show that t̄ − t is implicitly
defined by (A.1). The RHS of (A.1) under Γ′ is higher than the RHS of (A.1) under








∆(βi) > ∆(t̄− t).
Because t̄ − t > βi,23 the above condition always holds when b is more focused
(and hence ∆ is strictly decreasing), and is always violated when a is more focused
(and hence ∆ is strictly increasing).
Hence, when b is more focused, going from Γ to Γ′ leads to an increase of the
RHS of (A.1) and therefore to an increase in the salience of the transfer dimension,
and lower efficiency (by Corollary 1). Similarly, if a is more focused, going from
Γ to Γ′ leads to an decrease in the salience of the transfer dimension, and higher
efficiency.
















The argument is identical to the one presented in the proof of Lemma 1. The LHS
is strictly increasing in t̃1 − t
˜
1; the RHS is strictly decreasing in t̃1 − t
˜
1, and they
23It is easy to check that t̄− t = βi whenever there is only issue i on the table, but t̄− t > βi as
long as there is at least one additional issue on the table.
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always cross only once. Hence, t̃1− t
˜
1 exists and is unique. Together with (5.11) and
(5.12), this implies that t̃1 and t
˜
1 exist and are unique, so that also t̄1 and t1 exist
and are unique.
The second part of the proposition follows simply by comparing the above ex-
pression with (A.1) (see the proof of Lemma 1).
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